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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
Value-based decisions are a central aspect of life. Drawing from theories
and research methods in psychology, neuroscience, and economics, the stud-
ies presented in this thesis aimed towards understanding how value-based
decisions are made, and how they can best be investigated.
One puzzle in the study of value-based decisions is why people give in
to temptations such as overeating, or drug abuse, despite the fact that they
explicitly state that they do not wish to do so. The explanations that have
emerged for this phenomenon in psychology, neuroscience, and economics
highlight the role of the decision situation and the stimuli it contains. Not
only decisions regarding food intake or drug abuse are influenced by the
stimulus situation, but also typical economic decisions such as intertempo-
ral choice. Chapter 2 of this thesis summarizes the literature on situational
control of economic decisions. There is evidence that exposure to reward,
or to stimuli that are associated with reward, affects economic decisions in
several different domains. When faced with reward predicting stimuli in in-
tertemporal choice, people decide less patiently. In choice under uncertainty
they are more risk averse, and in consumer decisions they show higher will-
ingness to pay (WTP) and biased choice. We note that well-known biases in
decision making, namely dynamic inconsistency, certainty effects, and the
endowment effect, occur in decision situations that naturally entail some
form of immediacy to reward. Therefore, we argue that these biases could
be driven by a similar mechanism. This approach could help to organize a
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large amount of previously unconnected experimental results across differ-
ent decision domains.
In studies of individual decision making it is often necessary to measure
the value a person assigns to a good. To encourage participants to give true
and accurate answers, many studies make use of an incentivised value elic-
itation task, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. Chapter 3
of this thesis shows that in this task, people do not behave according to the
predictions of standard economic theory. Expected utility theory predicts
that a person should always report the same WTP for a given consumer
good, irrespective of the distribution of possible prices used in the BDM
mechanism. Instead, we observe that individual bids for the same good vary.
Specifically, subjects report higher WTP if this yields a significantly higher
chance of obtaining the item, i.e. they show distributional dependence with a
mass-seeking bias. Importantly, this bias persists over on average 140 value
elicitation trials per subject, strongly suggesting that distributional depen-
dence is a persistent phenomenon that is not abolished by experience. This
study casts doubt on the commonly held assumption that the BDM mecha-
nism induces truthful revelation of a fixed value a person assigns to a goods.
As the observed pattern is not in line with existing theories of anchoring
or reference-dependent preferences, this study highlights a novel violation
of expected utility theory that may provide useful insights on the processes
underlying valuation.
Individual time and risk preferences are an important component of eco-
nomic models and they are measured in many studies on human decision
making. Since they are defined by economic theory, the question whether
they exist as psychological constructs, and — if so — how they are best
described and measured, has received little attention in the economic lit-
erature. In Chapter 4 we show that commonly used elicitation tasks for
time and risk preferences generate reproducible results and thus possess
satisfactory reliability. Further, as the measured parameters are differen-
tially stable over several weeks, individual time and risk preferences can
be understood as individual characteristics that are at least moderately sta-
ble over time. However, our data suggest that time and risk preferences
measured with monetary choice tasks are specific to the domain of financial
decisions. Thus, if researchers or policy makers measure time and risk pref-
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erences using monetary choice tasks, the results cannot be generalized to
other domains, such as health- or career-related decisions. In order to refine
the definitions of time and risk preferences, future research should measure
indicators of time and risk preferences in different decision domains, both in
the laboratory and in the field.
Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests that stable interindividual dif-
ferences can be explained by interindividual differences in brain structure.
Identifying relationships between brain structure and stable interindivid-
ual differences can provide useful information on the relationship between
brain function and behaviour that is complementary to results from func-
tional neuroimaging. In Chapter 5 we investigate whether interindividual
differences in impulsiveness are associated with differences in brain struc-
ture. We use diffusion weighted magnetic resonance imaging to assess the
integrity of white matter. Specifically, we compute fractional anisotropy
(FA), which reflects the microstructural organization of connections between
brain regions and is an indicator of structural connectivity. Employing two
different methods to spatially co-register the individual datasets, we find
converging evidence that people who score higher on self-reported impulsive-
ness have higher white matter integrity in regions that contain connections
from the frontal cortex to subcortical regions. This result suggests that sta-
ble interindividual differences in impulsiveness might not arise from a lack
of inhibitory control by the frontal cortex, but from an excess of motivation
or drive. Measuring white matter integrity and comparing it across subjects
is a new and still rapidly developing neuroscientific technique. Therefore
these findings must be interpreted with caution.
The neuroeconomic model of choice postulates that value-based decisions
are performed by computing subjective value of each option under consider-
ation and choosing the option with the highest subjective value. Subjective
value of an option incorporates all aspects that are relevant to the desir-
ability of the option and can then be compared to that of other options. To
enable choice between fundamentally distinct options, subjective value must
be independent of the type of reward and represented on one common scale
of desirability. It is hypothesised that such an abstract subjective value sig-
nal is represented in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In Chapter 6 of
this thesis, we test this hypothesis using multivoxel pattern analysis of func-
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tional magnetic resonance data. We find that it is possible to predict indi-
vidual preferences from brain activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
Moreover, a model that is only trained to predict preferences over one spe-
cific category of reward, e.g. snack food items, can also predict preference
over a fundamentally distinct category of reward, e.g. engaging activities.
Therefore, subjective value representation for these two categories must be
similar. This is the case although engaging activities, such as playing tennis
or reading a book, have nothing in common with snack foods, are not eas-
ily substitutable by money and are not normally traded. This result strongly
suggests that subjective value representation in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex is abstract and maps subjective value on one common scale of desir-
ability for fundamentally distinct options.
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